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Anti-Climacus and Neo-Lockeanism
Towards a Kierkegaardian Personal Identity Theory
By Patrick Stokes
Abstract
This paper attempts to situate Anti-Climacus ontology of selfhood in the con-
text of contemporary personal identity theory. In important respects, Anti-Cli-
macus can be read as belonging to a tradition, originating with Locke, that
sees psychological continuity as conferring selfhood or personhood. However,
the curious temporal characteristics of spirit presented in The Sickness Unto
Death point to crucial differences between the Anti-Climacan approach to the
question of self-constitution and that taken by mainstream neo-Lockean person-
al identity theorists.
Introduction
William James once memorably described personal identity as “the most
puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal,”1 and the sheer vol-
ume of philosophical discussion that has attempted to deal with this puz-
zle lends James declaration no small amount of credence. A dizzying
range of positions have emerged within the literature – Reductionism,2
Eliminativism, 3 Animalism,4 Narrativism,5 Physicalism,6 “Closest Contin-
1 William James The Principles of Psychology, vols. I-2, New York: Dover 1950
[1890], vol. 1, p. 330.
2 The locus classicus of reductionism is Derek Parfit Reasons and Persons,Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1984.
3 E.g. James Giles No Self to be Found: The Search for Personal Identity, Lanham
MD: University Press of America 1997.
4 The literature on Animalism is expanding apace; for orientation, see e.g. Eric T.
Olson The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press 1997 and “An Argument for Animalism” in Personal Iden-
tity, edited by Raymond Martin and John Barresi, Maldon MA: Blackwell 2003,
pp. 318–334; Harold W. Noonan “Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current
Controversy” in The Philosophical Quarterly 48:192, July 1998, pp. 302–318;
Jens Johansson “What Is Animalism?” Ratio XX:2, June 2007, pp. 194–205.
uer” theory,7 Memory-theory,8 and many others besides – all attempting
either to locate the identity and persistence conditions of individual
selves, or else show that talk of selves is either superfluous or incoherent.
The concerns and approaches of theorists working in this area vary great-
ly, but the underlying questions they grapple with are perennial: what
makes me the same self that I “remember” being yesterday or anticipate
being tomorrow? What is a “self,” anyway? Are facts about personal
identity just reducible to impersonal facts about various forms of physical
and/or psychological continuity, or is there some “deep further fact”9 un-
derlying such continuities? These may sound like dry, abstract, academic
questions, but they connect with issues – crises of identity, alienation from
the past and future, memory loss, personality change, regret, repentance,
conversion – that form a real and tangible part of our lived, subjective ex-
perience.
It is therefore no surprise that the constitution and maintenance of
selfhood should form such a key element in Kierkegaard s articulation
of subjectivity. “Selfhood” as a distinct problem within Kierkegaard s au-
thorship begins at its very inception with On the Concept of Irony and
Either/Or and is the subject of a complex dialectical ontology in The Sick-
ness Unto Death. Kierkegaard offers a distinctively active, normative ac-
count of the self as a state to be achieved rather than always-already
given, something hard to attain and easy to lose. In the history of the phi-
losophy of self, these are unique and innovative claims; moreover, they
are couched in philosophically sophisticated terms and situated within a
remarkably rich phenomenology of moral experience.
5 Representative examples of the main streams of narrative theory include Alas-
dair MacIntyre After Virtue, 2nd Edition, Notre Dame IN: University of Notre
Dame Press 1984; Paul Ricoeur Oneself as Another, translated by Kathleen
Blamey, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995; Marya Schechtman The
Constitution of Selves, Ithaca NY and London: Cornell University Press 1996;
and Daniel Dennett “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity” in Self and Con-
sciousness: Multiple Perspectives, edited by F. S. Kessel, P. M. Cole and D. L.
Johnson, Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum 1992.
6 For a classic discussion of this viewpoint, see Bernard Williams Problems of the
Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1973, pp. 64–81.
7 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
1981, pp. 29–69.
8 A classic example is H. P. Grice “Personal Identity” in Mind 50:200, October
1941, pp. 330–350.
9 A key phrase in Parfit ; see Reasons and Persons, p. 309.
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Yet Kierkegaard s work on the self is conspicuously absent in contem-
porary discussions of selfhood – even in writers such as Ricoeur who have
sought to discuss personal identity in a way that draws on both the con-
tinental and analytic traditions.10 Anglophone philosophers of personal
identity in particular have failed to regard Kierkegaard as figuring in
the debate on selfhood, let alone as a potential resource for such discus-
sions. Equally, Kierkegaard commentators have largely ignored the ques-
tions raised by analytic philosophers and how these might pose challenges
for Kierkegaard. This mutual silence is perhaps understandable given the
very different language and concerns of Kierkegaardians and analytic
philosophers of personal identity: the effort necessary to understand
each other and make ourselves intelligible appears daunting, and the
risk of talking at cross-purposes is severe.
Moreover, there is an (admirable) corrective desire amongst com-
mentators to avoid reading Kierkegaard in isolation from the Idealist/He-
gelian intellectual context in which he is formed and against which his
work needs to be interpreted. Yet even Idealist accounts of self and iden-
tity owe something to earlier moves in English and Scottish thought
which have conditioned analytic discussions of the topic down to the pres-
ent day. Both the Anglophone and German traditions can ultimately
trace their origins to Locke s rejection of Cartesian Ego-Substantialism,
with Hume s sceptical response to Locke a key influence on the develop-
ment of German thought via Kant. Kierkegaard s account of the self as
the product of the “self relating to itself” can be understood as being
as much a moment in the history initiated by Locke s account of con-
sciousness making the self “self to itself” as in the history of Hegelian
and Idealist thought.11
The neo-Lockean literature contains a number of perennial and im-
portant questions that go to the heart of what we mean when we talk
about selfhood and identity. Would it not, therefore, contribute to our un-
derstanding of Kierkegaard s model of selfhood to see how Kierkegaard
might respond to some of these problems? Equally, mightn t Kierke-
gaard s work, with its richly-developed philosophical psychology, have
something useful and provocative to say to live discussions of selfhood?
The stage therefore appears to be set for a somewhat overdue dialogue
10 In e.g. Ricoeur Oneself as Another.
11 For a development of this topic, see Patrick Stokes “Locke, Kierkegaard, and the
Phenomenology of Personal Identity” in International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, forthcoming 2009.
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between Kierkegaard and contemporary personal identity theory. My aim
here is, in a modest way, to initiate such a dialogue.
In what follows, I attempt to situate the ontology of selfhood sketched
by Anti-Climacus within the conceptual frameworks of contemporary
personal identity theory, by showing the respects in which it both belongs
to and differs radically from the standard neo-Lockean positions. I then
focus on Anti-Climacus striking assertion that selfhood, once achieved,
can be lost. This claim can be seen to amplify a number of metaphysical
problems already familiar to the neo-Lockean literature. Explicating how
such problems might arise for Kierkegaardian selfhood, and how Kierke-
gaard might deal with them, will serve to highlight both the respects in
which Kierkegaard s account is compatible with the neo-Lockean attempt
to identify the identity and persistence conditions of selves, and the cru-
cial respects in which it departs from that project.
I.
The Sickness Unto Death outlines a distinctive, if initially opaque, rela-
tional ontology of selfhood. It is certainly an unusual ontology in that
its object never is but is only ever coming to be (“every moment that a
self exists, it is becoming [i Vorden], for the self jata dumalim does not ac-
tually exist, is simply that which ought to come into existence”),12 yet the
task Anti-Climacus sets himself is clearly ontological in character. In the
infamous opening paragraph, he seeks to distinguish between several
components encountered within selves and specify the conditions under
which those components constitute a self:
A human being is spirit [Mennesket er Aand]. But what is spirit? Spirit is the
self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is
the relation s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation
but is the relation s relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of
the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and eternal, of freedom and necessity,
in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this
way, a human being is still not a self.13
Note the rather tangled logic at work in this passage: the terms human,
spirit, self and self-relation are all stated to be equivalent, but then
“human” is defined as “synthesis” and “synthesis” is defined as not
12 SUD, 30 / SKS 11, 146, translation modified.
13 SUD, 13 / SKS 11, 129.
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being a self until it relates to itself (forholder sig til sig selv). The net effect
is to claim that self is a product of the human being s relating to itself in a
particular way, and only when the human being relates to itself in this way
can selfhood be said to exist. I don t propose to say too much about the
specific, phenomenal character of such self-relation here; for present pur-
poses it s enough to note that some form of self-relation on the part of the
human being (which Anti-Climacus later identifies as self-consciousness),
is the definitive condition for selfhood.
Discussions of this account of selfhood have tended to contextualise
backwards, noting the obvious Hegelian overtones of the key passages
in Sickness and trying to gauge whether these are offered ironically or
parodically, or whether Kierkegaard takes this ontology seriously. It is,
however, also possible to assess this ontology in another direction, by see-
ing where it fits among the competing positions within contemporary phi-
losophy of selfhood. Traditionally, the question of the identity and persis-
tence conditions of selves has been implicitly or explicitly understood as a
question of re-identification across time: what criterion/criteria would
need to be satisfied to licence us in saying that the person encountered
at t2 is the same person as the person encountered at t1?
14 There are
good reasons for doubting whether the re-identification question is really
the appropriate question for getting at what matters in selfhood; Marya
Schechtman has argued that characterization rather than re-identification
is the question that gets us closer to what we actually care about when
asking about personal identity (e.g., survival, self-interested concern,
moral responsibility, compensation),15 while Arne Grøn claims that we
don t re-identify ourselves in the criterial way we re-identify other ob-
jects.16 Still, if we bracket these quite legitimate concerns for the moment,
the re-identification approach does at least help to bring into focus the
question of what forms of continuity between the t1-person and the t2-per-
son would constitute continuity of self, i. e. , what has to persist in order
for selves to survive. Various forms of continuity present themselves as
candidates: biological/organism continuity, psychological facts such as
memory, ongoing projects and concerns, dispositions, character, self-nar-
14 See e.g. P.F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay In Descriptive Metaphysics, London
and New York: Routledge 1990 [1959] pp. 31–38 passim; Schechtman The Con-
stitution of Selves, pp. 7–25 passim.
15 Schechtman The Constitution of Selves, pp. 136–162.
16 Arne Grøn “Self and Identity” in The Structure and Development of Self-Con-
sciousness, edited by Dan Zahavi, Thor Gr nbaum and Josef Parnas, Amster-
dam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2004, pp. 128–130.
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rative, and so forth. Animalism (according to which a self or person just is
a particular human animal) is currently enjoying increasing adherence,
while the argument that selves are brains retains a degree of appeal,
but in general it has been “Psychological Criteria” or “neo-Lockean” the-
ories, those that see personal identity as inhering in some psychological
property or set of properties, that have been predominant.
Unfortunately for neo-Lockeans, each form of psychological continu-
ity presents its own problems, and so-called “science-fiction” scenarios –
mind-swaps, implanted memories, brain transplants, human fission and
fusion, teleportation, “Branch Line” cases, and so forth – can be con-
structed that can appear to invalidate almost any criteria that can be pos-
ited, simply by appealing to our intuitive response to such scenarios. A
classic example: if my brain is transplanted into my twin brother s
body, surely that s “me” that wakes up on the operating table; but
what if my brain was split and each half placed in the bodies of my triplet
brothers bodies? They can t both be me.17 The same applies if we simply
copy the totality of my brain-information into the brains of others without
performing any physical transplants at all. For reductionists such as Parfit,
this demonstrates that there is no “further fact” about identity: if I know
all the psychological and physical facts about a given human being, I
know everything there is to know about her identity. If, once we have
all these facts, we still want to ask a question about identity (“But is it
still her?”), it will admit of no non-arbitrary answer. Identity does not
go “deeper” than the (usually scalar) facts about continuity; there is no
underlying (non-scalar) “core” fact unifying the other facts about persons.
In light of the above, what sort of identity theorist is Anti-Climacus, if
indeed he can be read in these terms at all? Clearly his description of the
human being as a “synthesis” of physical and psychological properties
(which only becomes a self when it relates to itself) rules out any kind
of physical-criterion approach. Nor is he any sort of Animalist, as self-
hood is an achieved qualification that supervenes upon being a human
being, but cannot be reduced simply to being a human (for “[a] human
being is a synthesis” and considered merely as such “a human being is
still not a self.”)18 It may seem then that there is a “further fact” about
selfhood for Anti-Climacus, especially as selfhood is not merely the “neg-
ative unity” of the oppositions (both physical and psychological) that
make up the human being but a “positive third” that unites them in its
17 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 253–261.
18 SUD, 13 / SKS 11, 129.
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self-relation.19 Nonetheless, Anti-Climacus is not giving us some sort of
Substantialist model; there isn t, to use Anthony Rudd s phrase, a “meta-
physical pincushion”20 holding together each accidental property of the
self. Anti-Climacus replaces the substantial res cogitans of the Cartesian
rationalists with a relational process: “Self is not a substance, but a rela-
tion, or, to be more precise, self is a process: self-relating.”21 The Anti-Cli-
macan “further fact” is thus to be found within the psychology of the
human being, a fact about how it relates to itself, not something superad-
ded to the facts of psychology.22
It is therefore rather hard to state clearly whether the Anti-Climacan
model is reductionist or non-reductionist. But what is clear is that if The
Sickness Unto Death contains a genuine ontological claim about selfhood
– and even if this is not Kierkegaard s intention, it can clearly be read as
such – it is one that belongs to the neo-Lockean, “Psychological Criteria”
side of the personal identity debate rather than the Physicalist or Animal-
ist side. Human beings are both physical and mental entities, but selves
are the outcome of a distinctively psychological form of self-relation on
the human being s part:
In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the
two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qual-
ification of the psychical [under Bestemmelsen Sjel] the relation between the psy-
19 SUD, 13 / SKS 11, 129. I here follow the interpretation as given by e.g. John
Elrod that “negative unity” here refers to the fact that the elements held in ten-
sion stand in opposition to each other and cannot be understood apart from one
another. See John W. Elrod Being and Existence in Kierkegaard s Pseudonymous
Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 30. This interpretation
therefore says nothing about the way the self relates to the opposition. Other in-
terpretations have been given, such as Hubert Dreyfus claim that “negative
unity” refers to “denying one set of factors and acting as if only the other aspect
of the self is the essential one.” This is an interesting reading, but it is not clear to
me that it fits the text: this would be a form of despair i. e. a misrelation of spirit,
whereas “negative unity” appears to describe an element in the sub-spiritual
structure of personhood. Hubert L. Dreyfus “Kierkegaard on the Self” in Ethics,
Love and Faith in Kierkegaard, edited by Edward F. Mooney, Bloomington IN:
Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 14.
20 Anthony Rudd “Narrative, Expression and Mental Substance” in Inquiry 48:5,
October 2005, p. 419.
21 Grøn “Self and Identity,” p. 131.
22 Though arguably something is added in that the self-relationship depends on a
relationship to God that can only be discerned through a gift of grace.
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chical and the physical is a relation. If, however, this relation relates itself to it-
self, this relation is the positive third, and this is the self. 23
Anti-Climacus uses sjel, “soul,” to mean something like “mental” (the
Hong s translation “psychical” is apt, if necessarily un-poetic), but the
term is used here entirely without Substantialist connotations. As such
it is closer to Locke s use of “consciousness” than “soul.” Locke under-
stands the latter term in the traditional sense of immaterial substance
and thinks we can know nothing about it, and in any case asserts that it
plays no role in the conferring of selfhood, for the one self could theoret-
ically inhere in multiple substances and vice versa. For Locke, it is con-
sciousness that marks the distinction between the identity conditions of
the “man” (human) and the “self”:
For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with
the same Consciousness it has of it at first, and with the same Consciousness
it has of any present Action; so far is it the same personal Self. For it is by
the Consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and Actions, that it is Self to
it Self now, and so will be the same Self, as far as the same Consciousness can
extend to Actions past, or to come.24
Anti-Climacus, too, explicitly claims that the actualization of selfhood is a
function of consciousness:
Generally speaking, consciousness – that is, self-consciousness – is decisive with
regard to the self. The more consciousness, the more self [Jo mere Bevisthed jo
mere Selv]; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self.
A person who has no will at all is not a self; but the more will he has, the more
self-consciousness he has also.25
Because Locke was interpreted as claiming that the possession of memo-
ries confers selfhood, discussion immediately turned from consciousness
to the persistence of memory, a criterion for identity that is famously
fraught with difficulties. Yet Locke and Anti-Climacus are both making
the claim that selfhood is the product of consciousness, understood in
both thinkers as a sort of appropriative, active subjective process (note
that Locke s self is “self to itself” and describes self, the product of ex-
tended consciousness, as “a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and
their Merit.”)26 Hence Anti-Climacus has more in common with the
23 SUD, 13 / SKS 11, 129, emphasis added.
24 John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 10th Edition, London:
Edmund Parker 1731 [1690], p. 287.
25 SUD, 29 / SKS 11, 145.
26 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 296.
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Lockean tradition – or at least with Locke – than might be immediately
supposed.
It could be objected here that Anti-Climacus reference to “more
self” is antithetical to the traditional understanding of identity as a strict,
all-or-nothing logical relation: the phrase “more identical” seems as inco-
herent as “slightly pregnant.” Already, here, we can begin to discern re-
spects in which what Anti-Climacus is offering is something different to
the self that is sought in the neo-Lockean tradition. But it does seem
clear that Sickness Unto Death develops an ontology that in many re-
spects is recognizable as belonging to that tradition, thematically if not
genealogically, in that it takes self as arising from consciousness itself
rather than from the inherence of accidents in a substance or the persis-
tence of biological or physical facts about human beings.
Anti-Climacus also implicitly seems to adopt a distinction that is com-
monly encountered in the contemporary literature (though not limited to
neo-Lockeanism) between a narrative self (a self-image or self-conception
that is diachronically constituted) and a core or minimal self, the present
locus of consciousness which relates to the diachronically-extended narra-
tive self.27 This is most apparent in his discussion of the “man of immedi-
acy,” who has only the dimmest conception that he may be more than the
sum of his external relations, who fundamentally:
…has no consciousness of a self that is won by infinite abstraction from every
externality, this naked abstract self, which, compared with immediacy s fully
dressed self, is the first form of the infinite self and the advancing impetus in
the whole process by which a self infinitely becomes responsible for its actual
self with all its difficulties and advantages.28
The person of immediacy has a minimal degree of interaction between his
minimal and narrative self to the extent that “[h]e appropriates what in
his language he calls his self, that is, whatever capacities, talents, etc, he
may have,” but only does so “in an outward-bound direction” that loses
itself in absorption into the world.29 Accordingly, the notion of a self strip-
ped of all external determinants, such as we might become in the afterlife
for example, proves baffling for such an outwardly-turned individual:
27 Shaun Gallagher “Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cog-
nitive Science” in Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4:1, January 2000, p. 15; Dan Za-
havi “Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding” in Narrative and
Understanding Persons, edited by Daniel D. Hutto, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007, pp. 179–201.
28 SUD, 55 / SKS 11, 170.
29 SUD, 56 / SKS 11, 171.
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“The question of immortality has often occupied him, and more than
once he has asked the pastor whether there is such an immortality, wheth-
er one would actually recognise himself again – something that certainly
must be of very particular interest to him, since he has no self.”30 The ab-
sence of self here is ambiguous: the minimal self is always present and is
the condition for the subject asking questions about itself at all, yet inso-
far as it does not relate (non-despairingly) to the moments of its narrative
self, it is not a self in the true sense. And this closes off any potential re-
turn to a pre-Lockean Substantialist account of the self. The minimal self
is a necessary condition for the actualization of selfhood, because only it
can disentangle itself from externality and relate itself to something tran-
scendent (namely the “power” which established it). Yet insofar as to be a
self is not merely to have a minimal self, i. e. , to be a single point of con-
sciousness, the minimal self does not constitute a substance to which the
accidental qualifications of the narrative self inhere.
At the other extreme, it is the awareness of the “naked abstract self,”
the “infinite self” or self in “the most abstract form” that makes the de-
spair of willing to be oneself despairingly possible, “severing the self from
any relation to a power that has established it” and from its concrete de-
terminants, wanting ex nihilo “to compose his self by means of being the
infinite form.”31 Yet such a self can find nothing more to compose itself
out of than its existing concrete facticity (“no derived self can give itself
more than it is in itself by paying attention to itself”)32 and cannot cease
being that facticity; in other words, the minimal self can never succeed in
divesting itself of its narrative self. It “remains itself from first to last; in
its self-redoubling it becomes neither more nor less than itself,” and “[i]n
so far as the self in its despairing striving to be itself works itself into the
very opposite, it really becomes no self.”33 The minimal self, when it de-
nies its facticity, is reduced to “a king without a country, absolutely ruling
over nothing; his position, his sovereignty, is subordinate to the dialectic
that rebellion is legitimate at any moment.”34
30 SUD, 56 / SKS 11, 171.
31 SUD, 68 / SKS 11, 182. For a recent discussion of Kierkegaard s critique of sub-
jectivity s desire to “compose” or posit itself under its own power, see K. Brian
Sçderquist The Isolated Self: Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard s On the
Concept of Irony, Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 2007.
32 SUD, 69 / SKS 11, 183.
33 SUD, 69 / SKS 11, 183.
34 SUD, 69 / SKS 11, 183.
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A final point of apparent congruity between neo-Lockeanism and
The Sickness Unto Death is the discussion, relatively late in the book,
of continuity (Continueerlighed) and consistency (Conseqvents). Psycho-
logical continuity as a constituent of self is a discernible theme through-
out Kierkegaard s authorship beginning with the emphasis on “continui-
ty” of self in On the Concept of Irony. The ironist loses himself in a series
of disconnected moods,35 which, as K. Brian Sçderquist puts it, “remain
internally unconnected and thus the inner continuity which binds a self
together is lacking.”36 The idea of a self being “bound” together via the
internal connectedness of psychological states across time is, of course,
the standard neo-Lockean picture of personal identity, and it is a key fac-
tor in Kierkegaard s claim that psychologically atomised subjects such as
the ironist are not, in fact, selves. Such deliberate ironic atomization of
psychological moments is also a key feature in the aesthete s flight
from boredom in Either/Or, most clearly evident in “The Rotation of
Crops” where the capacity to become absorbed in disconnected trivia
(such as a bead of sweat running down an interlocutor s face) is lauded.37
For the fully-developed aesthete, “No part of life ought to have so much
meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any moment he wants to,”38
and accordingly, a stable continuity of memory, mood and disposition is
rendered impossible. Anti-Climacus diagnoses this condition in most peo-
ple, the great mass of “spiritless” individuals living lives of “endearing
childish naivet ” or “shallow triviality” whose lives lack any deep con-
necting thread between incidents:
Their lives…are made up of some action of sorts, some incidents, of this and
that: now they do something good, and then something stupid, and then they
begin all over again; now they are in despair for an afternoon, perhaps for
three weeks, but then they are jolly fellows again, and then once again in despair
for a day. They play along in life, so to speak, but they never experience putting
everything together on one thing, never achieve the idea of an infinite self-con-
sistency. That is why they are always talking among themselves about the partic-
ular, particular good deeds, particular sins.39
Locke speaks of sameness of consciousness as conferring personal identi-
ty, and Anti-Climacus too speaks of extended consciousness as the condi-
35 CI, 284 / SKS 1, 320.
36 Sçderquist The Isolated Self, p. 160.
37 EO1, 299 / SKS 2, 288.
38 EO1, 293 / SKS 2, 282.
39 SUD, 107 / SKS 11, 219.
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tion for the consistency and continuity across time that constitutes self-
hood:
But how rare is the person who has continuity with regard to his consciousness
of himself! As a rule, men are conscious only momentarily, conscious in the
midst of big decisions, but they do not take the daily everyday into account at
all; they are spirit of sorts for an hour one day a week – which, of course, is a
rather crude [bestialsk] way to be spirit. But eternity is the essential continuity
and demands this of a person or that he be conscious as spirit and have faith.40
Self-consciousness issues in a qualitative “consistency” which amounts to
existing qua spirit.41 Yet this consistency is not a function of psychological
continuity per se but of the self-relating activity that constitutes selfhood,
an active appropriation rather than mere succession.42 Selves qualified as
spirit have “an essential interior consistency and a consistency in some-
thing higher, at least in an idea,” and actively cultivate such consistency
and guard against its dissolution whereby the subject would “be torn
out of the totality in which he has his life” and plunged into “a chaos
in which there is no agreement within itself, no momentum, no impetus.”43
The stakes are high: to lose consistency is to face an “infinite loss” which
is the loss of selfhood itself, the loss of an integrated, coherent and spiri-
tually qualified totality that “[i]mmediate individuals, the childlike or
childish,” lost in a succession of disconnected particularities, never have.44
This active, appropriative function of self-consciousness marks an es-
sential difference between continuity of spirit, with its “essential continu-
ity of the eternal through being before God in faith,”45 and the merely
psychological continuity of sinfulness which gains its own “increasingly
established continuity”46 as it persists over time. Just as moments of,
say, anger can be said to be expressions of a continuous disposition of
short-temperedness that exists outside of the individual incidents, so
“[i]n the deepest sense, the state of sin is the sin; the particular sins are
40 SUD, 105 / SKS 11, 217.
41 SUD, 107 / SKS 11, 219.
42 This is arguably true of Locke too; see my “Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phe-
nomenology of Personal Identity.” However, see also Grøn “Self and Identity,”
p. 133: “Locke s account of memory oscillates between simple re-identification
and ethical appropriation. Or, rather, he does not see the difference, which
means that he cannot account for what appropriation is.”
43 SUD, 107 / SKS 11, 219.
44 SUD, 107–108 / SKS 11, 219.
45 SUD, 105 / SKS 11, 218.
46 SUD, 106 / SKS 11, 218.
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not the continuance of sin but the expression for the continuance of sin;
in the specific new sin the impetus of sin merely becomes more percepti-
ble to the eye [sandselig mere til at bemærke].”47 For the demonic person-
ality, for whom there is a kind of self-conscious wilfulness in his sinning, it
is only the continuity of sin that binds him into a self; “the state of sin is
what holds him together deep down where he has sunk, profanely
strengthening him with its consistency.”48 For present purposes it is impor-
tant to note that this analysis of the sinner is a classic neo-Lockean pic-
ture of a self constituted by the persistence of psychological states.
Anti-Climacus endorses one type of continuity (spirit, religiously-quali-
fied active self-appropriation) as self-constituting and denies another (sin-
fulness) that status, but choosing between forms of continuity in this way
seems to wed Anti-Climacus to the foundational neo-Lockean claim that
at least some form of psychological continuity across time is what consti-
tutes selfhood. Or so, at first blush, it appears.
Yet if Anti-Climacus does take some form of psychologically-mediat-
ed continuity across time to be constitutive of selfhood, his account will
run into the same serious problems that psychological identity theorists
since Locke have never entirely managed to overcome. We now turn to
a consideration of some of these problems.
II.
Perhaps Anti-Climacus most innovative contribution to the philosophi-
cal discussion of selves is his claim that selfhood is something to be ach-
ieved rather than always already given, and moreover, something that can
be lost. As we ve seen above, Anti-Climacus claims that a distinctive, ac-
tive form of appropriative self-consciousness (one that relates to itself as
it relates to the power which established it) creates a continuity or consis-
tency that unifies the disparate moments of the subject s psychological ex-
perience into a coherent whole. Yet taken together, two claims made in
The Sickness Unto Death – that self-consciousness confers selfhood, and
that most people are only intermittently self-conscious – suggests that
selfhood may be fragile and easily lost. Anti-Climacus acknowledges
this as a very real danger:
47 SUD, 106 / SKS 11, 218.
48 SUD, 108 / SKS 11, 220.
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…it may not be detected that in a deeper sense he lacks a self. Such things do not
create much of a stir in the world, for a self is the last thing the world cares about
and the most dangerous thing of all for a person to show signs of having. The
greatest hazard of all, losing the self, can occur very quietly in the world, as if
it were nothing at all. No other loss can occur so quietly; any other loss – an
arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife etc. – is sure to be noticed.49
There is an important ambiguity in the way Anti-Climacus speaks of loss
of self, because in another sense the subject cannot get rid of itself: it can-
not rid itself of what it finds itself to be, and so death cannot save the de-
spairing person from despair,50 and the self cannot get rid of itself even in
a state of despairing misrelation:
For despair is not attributable to the misrelation but to the relation that relates
itself to itself. A person cannot rid himself of the relation to himself any more
than he can rid himself of his self, which, after all, is one and the same thing,
since the self is the relation to oneself.51
Note the curious claim at work in this passage and others that once self-
hood has been achieved it can never completely slip back into spiritless-
ness: “for that the self is too much self.”52 Yet Anti-Climacus discusses
loss of self often enough to suggest that he takes the possibility of ach-
ieved consciousness being forfeited seriously, and the equation of self-
consciousness (which he admits is usually sporadic) with selfhood
would seem to commit him to the claim that selves can be lost – and, pre-
sumably, regained.
It seems clear that Anti-Climacus takes it that some sort of psycho-
logical condition (namely non-despairing self-relatedness) has to be sus-
tained across time if selfhood is not to be lost. The problem, as genera-
tions of psychological-criterion identity theorists have found to their
cost, is that it seems almost impossible to specify any significant form
of psychological continuity that holds across a long enough period of
time to ground our intuitions about the unitary identity of individual per-
sons. Consciousness itself, of course, is not continual, nor is memory; this
leads to difficult questions about how identity can be maintained over pe-
riods of forgetfulness or sleep. Our standard intuition is that the person
who woke up this morning is the person who went to sleep last night.
Yet any theory that sees personal identity as conferred by continuity of
49 SUD, 32–33 / SKS 11, 148.
50 SUD, 21 / SKS 11, 136.
51 SUD, 17 / SKS 11, 133.
52 SUD, 62 / SKS 11, 177.
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consciousness would seem to furnish no more grounds for saying this than
for saying that every night we die, and every morning a new person is
born in the bed vacated by the previous day s person.53 To the extent
that Anti-Climacus implicitly identifies self-consciousness as the form
of psychological continuity that is constitutive of selfhood, he will have
to account for how the self can survive even the basic stretches of uncon-
sciousness that punctuate our lives. That, in itself, needn t be a decisive
objection to Anti-Climacus: perhaps a consciousness-based account
could be defended by stipulating that there is an intuitively permissible
level of disruption and discontinuity that doesn t compromise or destroy
selfhood.
Yet precisely because Anti-Climacus offers such a distinctive candi-
date for the psychological property which must persist in order for selves
to be constituted, the problems his account faces are correspondingly
more severe than those of the more orthodox neo-Lockean positions.
Anti-Climacan self-relation is a remarkably rigorous process of appropri-
ation: the self wills to be itself in the fullest sense, taking responsibility for
its entire history, concretion and situation. Insofar as each moment of self-
relation takes the whole self up into itself as itself, the self-relating subject
somehow “appropriates” all moments of its past and future. Each “life-
moment” as we might call it – each set of psychological, physical and so-
cial facts pertaining to the human being in question at each moment –
forms part of the self. Yet if such self-relation can cease, and then subse-
quently re-start, then so do selves, and we thus find ourselves with a met-
aphysical conundrum: how can something cease to exist and then come
back into existence? Or more accurately, what could license us in saying
that the same self comes back into existence rather than that a succession
of selves arise, each lasting as long as the period of self-consciousness?
How could we avoid saying that Anti-Climacus, like Galen Strawson, en-
dorses a picture where human beings have not one self but a succession of
short-lived selves that arise and pass away as a function of the psycholog-
ical state that produces them?54
The problem here is the familiar Parfitian one that we seem to be ask-
ing re-identification questions that can only have trivial or arbitrary an-
swers. If a group forms to re-constitute a club or society that hasn t exist-
ed in several decades, and claims to be the original club, the identity ques-
53 See Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 292.
54 Galen Strawson “The Self” in Personal Identity, edited by Martin and Barresi, p.
359.
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tion – is this the same club or a different one? – doesn t seem to admit of
a meaningful answer.55 We could, following Nozick, hold that the self that
arises in a moment of Anti-Climacan self-consciousness is the same self as
the one that existed in a previously concluded moment of self-conscious-
ness insofar as it is the “closest continuer” of that previous self.56 But this
certainly appeals to no “deep further fact” about selfhood; in effect, the
individual subject s self would have the same sort of identity as the mon-
arch of England: a succession of different individuals but all fulfilling the
same role. Anti-Climacus often mentions the self as being (or having
something) eternal, but under this scenario the self would only be “eter-
nal” in the sense that the English monarch never dies, only the individuals
fulfilling the role.
A closely related problem that besets neo-Lockean theory concerns
transitivity. Consider the following diagram. The circles represent the
consciousness existing at that time (i. e., the “core” or “minimal” self).
The arrows represent the range of past and future life-moments each mo-
ment of consciousness relates to itself. At t4 the self relates itself to its en-
tire history; hence all life-moments from t1 to tn are part of the self. At t5
this self-relation is lost, and is subsequently regained in another moment
of self-relation at t6 :
Note the effect this has on each life-moment: life moment t3, for in-
stance, is part of Self A at t4, not part of Self A at t5 and part of Self A
at t6. Hence faced with the question “Is the life-moment t3 a moment in
the life of Self A?” we cannot give a tenseless “yes” or “no.” Yet because
identity is classically regarded as a transitive logical relationship (A=B
and B=C entails A=C), identity questions always ask for tenseless an-
swers, and when these can t be given, the criteria upon which identity is
claimed to obtain are called into question. Thomas Reid offers a classic
example of this objection. A young boy is beaten for stealing fruit from
55 Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 213.
56 Nozick Philosophical Explanations, pp. 29–69.
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an orchard. As a youth he becomes a soldier and bravely captures a stan-
dard in battle. As an old man, he becomes a General. At the time of the
battle, the young soldier remembers his childish transgression and the
subsequent punishment. As an old man, he remembers capturing the
flag, but he has forgotten the orchard incident completely. If memory is
taken as the criterion for, rather than merely as evidence of, personal
identity (as Reid, perhaps unfairly, thought Locke took it to be), then
we are left with the logically intolerable consequence that while the
boy and the young soldier are the same person, and the young solider
and the old general are the same person, the old general and the boy
are not the same person: A=B, B=C, C¼6 A.57 This will apply to any
form of psychological continuity that does not hold uniformly across an
entire human life, not just memory, and it seems doubtful we could find
any forms of continuity that do so hold (what sort of significant psycho-
logical connections could hold between an infant and adult, for exam-
ple?)58 Anti-Climacan self-consciousness, which is presented to us as fre-
quently intermittent, clearly wouldn t fit the bill.
There only appear to be two things we can say about the situation de-
picted in the diagram: either Self A successively comes into, goes out of,
and comes back into existence – in which case, as we ve seen, we have
strong metaphysical grounds to doubt whether there s any force in the
declaration that the self at t6 is the same self as the self at t4 – or we
admit that two (or more) selves exist which appropriate exactly the
same life-moments. This would apparently involve multiple selves super-
vening upon the same life-moments, such that we will find it hard to say
how many selves exist at any given point t1, t2…tn. There is a parallel here
with the well-worn “fission” thought-experiments offered throughout the
neo-Lockean literature. Suppose Person X somehow splits, amoeba-like,
into two distinct persons, Y and Z, both of whom then claim to “be” X by
dint of having X s memories, character, commitments etc. When faced
with the question “is Yand/or Z the same person as the pre-fission person
X?” then the one-one, transitive character of the logical relation of iden-
tity would force us to conclude either a) X has died and Y and Z have
come into existence, or b) in the pre-fission state there were three, indis-
57 Thomas Reid Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man, vols. 1–3,
Dublin: P. Byrne and J. Milliken 1790 [1788], vol. 1, p. 397.
58 Carol Rovane “Self-Reference: The Radicalization of Locke” in The Journal of
Philosophy 90:2, February 1993, p. 77; also Noonan “Animalism Versus Lock-
eanism,” p. 312, citing Olson.
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tinguishable persons, X, Yand Z, “inhabiting” one body.59 And this seems
plainly untenable.
These problems are bad enough for identity theorists who do not
posit self as something to be achieved and something that can be lost.
With Anti-Climacus, who makes this further move, the problems are ac-
cordingly amplified. One response might be a quasi-reductionist one: to
read “self” as simply another name for, rather than a product of, self-con-
sciousness, and so see Anti-Climacan selfhood as the name for a state
which individual human beings are in some of the time. The effect of
this move would be to divorce meaningful questions about personal iden-
tity from questions of selfhood: it s not selves (which would be temporary
psychological states) who bear moral responsibility or who are the objects
of our self-interested concern, but human beings. Yet this is clearly a long
way from what Anti-Climacus wants to claim for the self: for him, it s
surely selves that are called to answer morally and eschatologically. In
short, Anti-Climacus wants there to be a “deep further fact” about self-
hood underlying the disparate moments of psychological experience,
wants this deep further fact to be psychological in character, and wants
it to inhere in a state of consciousness that, by his own admission, is
not always achieved and can be intermittent in character. How, then,
do we get out of the apparent logical contradictions and incoherencies
his account throws up? The answer is to be found in the distinctive tem-
poral character Anti-Climacus assigns to self-experience, something that
marks a crucial point of differentiation from the neo-Lockean tradition
within which we have sought to situate him.
III.
An interesting feature of the contexts in which Anti-Climacus discusses
loss-of-self is that he appears to conflate loss of self with never having
had a self, or the loss of an already-achieved state with never achieving
that state in the first place. The major discussion of loss of self concerns
the person of immediacy who has “emasculated oneself in a spiritual
sense” through thoughtless immersion in a finite world that “has no un-
derstanding of the reductionism and narrowness involved in having lost
oneself, not by being volatilised in the infinite, but by being completely
finitized, by becoming a number instead of a self, just one more man,
59 Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 257.
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just one more repetition of this everlasting Einerlei.”60 Caught up in the
stream of finite factors against which it never differentiates itself, the fini-
tised subject offers no resistance and takes no risks:
Not to venture is prudent. And yet, precisely by not venturing it is so terribly
easy to lose what would be hard to lose, however much one lost by risking,
and in any case never this way, so easily, so completely, as if it were nothing
at all – namely, oneself. If I have ventured wrongly, well, then life helps me
by punishing me. But if I have not ventured at all, who helps me then? More-
over, what if not by venturing at all in the highest sense (and to venture in
the highest sense is precisely to become aware of oneself) I cowardly gain all
earthly advantages – and lose myself!61
The person of immediacy is ground “as smooth as a rolling stone,”62 al-
lowing it to pass through the social and commercial world easily and with-
out friction. In what sense does this count as losing a self? Interestingly,
this is not so much to lose a state that has already been attained, as to lose
the possibility of becoming a self, like a raw material that is simply ground
down rather than ground into the shape that it was intended for.63 Com-
pare Anti-Climacus claims here with the image of the “inner being”
being “stillborn” in the veronymous discourse “Strengthening the Inner
Being”: if the “concern” for transcendent meaning whereby the subject
comes to differentiate itself from the world leads that person to “have
in mind deciding this matter once and for all and then being finished
with it,” then “the inner being would only be stillborn and would vanish
again.”64 Here too the ontological status of the inner being is ambiguous:
it vanishes “again,” yet it is also “stillborn,” suggesting that it is both si-
multaneously something that has been lost and something that never
came into being in the first place. In the same way, “secular” or “philis-
tine-bourgeois” persons of immediacy, who never tear themselves out
of finitude s prudential calculations of probability to relate themselves
to something infinite and transcendent, “have no self, no self for whose
sake they could venture everything, no self before God”65 and yet such
a self “has lost his self and God.”66 In the first instance it appears clear
that the self has never existed (the self of immediacy hasn t degenerated
60 SUD, 33 / SKS 11, 149.
61 SUD, 34–35 / SKS 11, 150.
62 SUD, 34 / SKS 11, 150.
63 SUD, 33 / SKS 11, 149.
64 EUD, 87 / SKS 5, 94.
65 SUD, 35 / SKS 11, 151, my emphasis.
66 SUD, 41 / SKS 11, 156, my emphasis.
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into bourgeois thoughtlessness, but has always existed within it), and yet
the self has at the same time been lost.
This curious conflation of the self s having been lost with its never
having existed at all also features elsewhere in Anti-Climacus descrip-
tions of despair. When the “philistine-bourgeois” finds himself confront-
ed by adversity, then he despairs: but this reveals that he was in despair
already, in that he lacked “faith s possibility of being able under God to
save a self from certain downfall.”67 To despair is to be revealed as having
been always in despair: “for whenever that which triggers his despair oc-
curs, it is immediately apparent that he has been in despair his whole
life….Despair is a qualification of the spirit, is related to the eternal,
and thus has something of the eternal in its dialectic.”68 This “eternal” el-
ement here amounts to despair being always present at all points in the
life of the subject up to the despair-event that discloses it.
The other side of this eternal element in the dialectic is that being
saved from despair is somehow to be permanently saved. Anti-Climacus
tells us that not being in despair is different from not being lame, for
the non-lame person can still become lame in the future, whereas to be
saved from despair is to lose the very possibility of despairing itself:
“Not to be in despair must signify the destroyed possibility of being
able to be in despair; if a person is truly not to be in despair, he must
at every moment destroy the possibility.”69 If the self is cured of despair,
then it thereby continually destroys the possibility of ever despairing
again, and, as a corollary, if the self does despair again this shows that
it was always in despair all along and was never in fact saved.70 As despair
is equivalent to loss of self, and to be saved from despair is to acquire a
self, this amounts to the claim that to lose the self is never to have had a
self in the first place, and to gain a self is to gain it once and for all.
This is surely puzzling and decidedly un-Kierkegaardian. If salvation
from despair depends upon a particular state of consciousness, one that
can be punctual and intermittent and that must be actively maintained,
how could it be the case that we lose the possibility of sinking back
into despair? If selfhood is achieved through such a precarious and fragile
67 SUD, 41 / SKS 11, 156.
68 SUD, 24 / SKS 11, 140.
69 SUD, 15 / SKS 11, 131.
70 Importantly, being saved from despair is always a redemption, so while the de-
spairing self was always in fact in despair, it is not the case that the self saved-
from-despair was always in fact saved.
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mental state, how could it be the case that selfhood is never lost – and if it
is never lost, why use the strong, distinctive phrase “loss of self” at all?
Why not simply talk about selfhood never being achieved, or about the
capacity for selfhood being squandering,71 rather than saying repeatedly
that the self can be lost?
The answer is perhaps to be found by following a suggestion made
five years earlier in Either/Or. In his discussion of the category of the
“first love,” Judge William cites the claim in Hebrews 6:4–6 that those
who have been converted and subsequently relapse can never be saved
again: “Here, then, the first acquired its whole profound meaning. In
the first, the whole profound Christian life proclaimed itself, and then
the person who blundered in it was lost. But here the eternal is drawn
too much into temporal qualifications.”72 The final sentence suggests
that we make a category mistake if we consider questions of salvation
in temporally schematised terms; William s attempt to dismiss a poten-
tially disturbing theological problem depends upon a denial that we can
fully apply temporal categories such as duration, pastness and completion
to questions of faith and salvation. In Sickness Unto Death, this idea man-
ifests itself in the curious temporal characteristics of despair. Both despair
and selfhood have something of the “eternal” in them, but this is not pre-
sented to us as simply infinitely extended temporal duration. Rather, the
eternality of despair can be read as an expression of its resolutely “pres-
ent tense” character:
Every actual moment of despair is traceable to possibility; every moment he is
in despair he is bringing it upon himself. It is always the present tense; in rela-
tion to the actuality there is no pastness of the past: in every actual moment of
despair the person in despair bears all the past as present in possibility.73
This present-tense character is rarely attended to in the critical litera-
ture,74 and this is perhaps understandable given all the ways in which
Anti-Climacus seems to emphasise continuity and consistency across
time – precisely the characteristics which, as we ve seen, suggest that
Anti-Climacus belongs to the psychological criteria school of personal
identity theory. And undeniably, Anti-Climacus does present sin and de-
spair as states which can be described in terms of temporal extension,
states with histories across time. It is perfectly possible to narrate histories
71 Another term Anti-Climacus employs e.g. SUD, 31 / SKS 11, 147.
72 EO2, 41 / SKS 3, 48.
73 SUD, 17 / SKS 11, 132–33.
74 It is discussed briefly in Dreyfus “Kierkegaard on the Self,” p. 15.
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of immediate persons: “Meanwhile, time passes…a self he was not, and a
self he did not become, but he goes on living, qualified only by immedi-
acy…he dies, the pastor ushers him into eternity for ten rix-dollars – but a
self he was not, and a self he did not become.”75 Yet this is essentially the
history of the human being, the synthesis of polar opposites which, when
it relates to itself, becomes a self. What I wish to claim here is that, in
Anti-Climacan ontology, the temporal character of selves differs from
the temporal nature of human beings. Humans are things in the world,
things that (as Heidegger famously said in his introductory lectures on
Aristotle) are born, work and die,76 things that carve out spatio-temporal
paths through the world and whose durations can be measured with stop-
watches and calendars. With selves, it s not so simple. And the key to this
complication is the self s qualification as eternal.
IV.
As noted above, the lives of immediate people can be quite successfully
narrated from the outside, lives with more-or-less definite beginnings,
middles and ends. Yet Anti-Climacus insists that such things are not au-
tomatically selves, but can only become selves through a sort of self-con-
scious appropriation of themselves over and above any facts of psycho-
logical continuity their lives may have. The reach of this appropriative
self-relation is extensive: all moments of facticity are brought into self-
hood through this mechanism. In this way it becomes clear that such
self-relation is something more than just affective identification with psy-
chologically similar parts of our lives, something that we notoriously can
lose over time (consider the reformed criminal who looks back at his past
and can no longer identify with the self he remembers being, lacking as he
does what Schechtman has called “empathic access”).77 The subjective
character of such self-relation must therefore be something quite distinc-
tive in that it can appropriate a totality that may incorporate significant
psychological change across time. And this distinctiveness finds its ex-
pression partly in the temporal character of subjective self-experience.
75 SUD, 52 / SKS 11, 167–68.
76 Cited in Herman Philipse Heidegger s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpre-
tation, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1998, p. xiii.
77 Marya Schechtman “Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Iden-
tity” in Personal Identity, edited by Martin and Baresi, pp. 238–259.
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In the quote given above, despair, as the self s despairing misrelation
to its facticity, has the curious quality of compressing the past into the
present: “in relation to the actuality there is no pastness of the past: in
every actual moment of despair the person in despair bears all the past
as present in possibility.”78 This interesting formulation (related, I
would suggest, to the phenomenology of Samtidighed, “contemporaneity”
that Kierkegaard develops across his authorship),79 places the emphasis
on the present moment, removing the temporal distance and alterity con-
ferred by pastness and bringing the self s past into full presence in the
present moment. What this suggests is that the experience of temporality
in self-relation, whether despairing or non-despairing, differs radically
from that which applies when regarding human beings as human beings.
Rather than diachronic continuity, self-relation apparently involves an ex-
perience of self in robustly present-tense, synchronic terms.
This present-tense character of all moments of the self is a function of
the transfiguring effect of the self coming to relate itself to the eternal, to
that which transcends time. Anti-Climacus insists in several places that
the self has something of the eternal in it, something it can never rid itself
of, and this language naturally invokes the idea of an eternal soul or im-
material substance underlying all moments of selfhood. It is indeed pos-
sible to make a prima facie case for the eternal as a form of “unchange-
ability,” which as Mark C. Taylor notes is a consistent referent of Kierke-
gaard s use of the term eternal,80 which would bring us back to continuity
across time. However, if we accept that Anti-Climacus rejects Substanti-
alism, it becomes difficult to see what could count as an unchangeable el-
ement in the “stuff” of human existence that remains. We have noted that
sin has a kind of continuity and temporal extension to it, and accordingly
it is easy to assume that the “continuity” of sin and the “continuity” of
non-despairing selfhood are the same thing. In that case, if we could
point to one human and say he is in despair and then point to another
and say she is saved from despair, we would simply be offering soteriolog-
ically evaluative descriptions of their respective underlying psychological
continuities: this temporally-extended psychology is in a state of sin, that
78 SUD, 17 / SKS 11, 132–33.
79 On this topic, see my “ See For Your Self : Contemporaneity, Autopsy and Pres-
ence in Kierkegaard s Moral-Religious Psychology” in British Journal for the
History of Philosophy (forthcoming), and “Locke, Kierkegaard, and the Phe-
nomenology of Personal Identity.”
80 Mark C. Taylor Kierkegaard s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and
the Self, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1975, p. 91.
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temporally-extended psychology is not in sin and has therefore achieved
selfhood. Yet the curious temporal characteristics we ve come across so
far – the presence of all moments of the past in despair, the apparently
“once and for all” character of despair and selfhood – suggest that the
continuity conferred by the eternal appears to be something radically dif-
ferent from these forms of straightforward psychological continuity.
The move out of unconscious despair into self-relation involves a pro-
gressively greater awareness of the individual s relation to the eternal,
and this results in a synchronic rather than diachronic experience of
time. The person of immediacy lives purely in temporal flow and has
nothing of the eternal other than the structural potential for eternality in-
herent in all humans. As despair becomes progressively more self-con-
scious, it attains to a correspondingly greater relation to the eternal, to
that which transcends temporality. Hence the person trapped in self-in-
closing despair “goes on living horis succesivis [hour after hour],” yet
“even if not lived for eternity, his hours have something to do with the
eternal and are concerned with the relation of his self to itself – but he
never really gets beyond that.”81 This self has at least some sort of relation
to the eternal – in that he rejects it – but is nevertheless still embedded in
time experienced as a mere succession of moments. Yet even though the
self caught in this sort of despair tries to reject the eternal as the non-tem-
poral that transcends and transfigures time, spirit (self-relation) is always
a relation to the eternal and so its despairing self-(mis)relation is always
present-tense:
…to despair is a qualification of spirit and relates to the eternal in man. But he
cannot rid himself of the eternal – no, never in all eternity. He cannot throw it
away once and for all, nothing is more impossible; at any moment that he does
not have it, he must have thrown it or is throwing it away – but it comes again,
that is, every moment he is in despair he is bringing his despair upon himself.82
The despair of Indesluttedhed (“inclosing reserve” or “withdrawal”)
therefore shows up clearly the two divergent experiences of time proper
to the human being (the person regarded simply as a synthesis of oppos-
ing elements), and to spirit (the synthesis relating to itself). It also dem-
onstrates just how maddeningly complex the dialectic of self-as-human
and self-as-spirit is. To the extent that the despairing subject relates itself
to itself, it relates itself to the eternal, in a movement that takes the tem-
porally-extended synthesis that constitutes the human being up into a to-
81 SUD, 64 / SKS 11, 179.
82 SUD, 17 / SKS 11, 133.
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tality that relates itself as a totality to something transcendent. It cannot
successfully “throw away” the eternal because this cannot be done once
and for all : to throw away the eternal is to be throwing it away and
thus relating oneself to it: “every moment he is in despair he is bringing
his despair upon himself.”83 Despair, in Alastair Hannay s terms, is “an
action of the spiritual subject unwilling to conform to its true self,” and
to the extent that despair is thus a qualification of spirit, it therefore fun-
damentally relates to the eternal.84 Hence despair does not properly be-
long to the successive time in which the self tries to remain immersed;
it still retains a covert, self-effacing relationship to the eternal that it is
actively trying to avoid. In the most conscious forms of despair, the de-
spair of defiance, this reaches the level of consciously railing against eter-
nity and willing to remain in the concrete and temporal:
… he is afraid of eternity, afraid that it will separate him from his, demonically
understood, infinite superiority over other men, his justification, demonically
understood, for what he is. – Himself is what he wills to be. He began with
the infinite abstraction of the self, and now he has finally become so concrete
that it would be impossible to become eternal in that sense; nevertheless, he
wills in despair to be himself. What demonic madness – the thought that most
infuriates him is that eternity could get the notion to deprive him of his misery.85
Yet to defy the eternal in the self in this way is not to get rid of it, but in
fact to actively relate to it in every moment. Insofar as defiance repre-
sents such a conscious, willful misrelation within the spirit, it is “the de-
spairing misuse of the eternal within the self” or “despair through the
aid of the eternal”; for this reason it is simultaneously “very close to
the truth” and “infinitely far away.”86
It is also suggestive that, as we are told in a footnote, children (who
Kierkegaard claims in Johannes Climacus do not possess self-conscious-
ness)87 cannot despair because they only have the eternal present in
them in potentiality.88 Children are clearly human beings, yet to the extent
that they are not self-relationally conscious they are not (at least accord-
ing to Anti-Climacus!) selves. Yet if eternality is only present in them to
83 SUD, 17 / SKS 11, 133.
84 Alastair Hannay “Spirit and the Idea of the Self as a Reflexive Relation” in In-
ternational Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death, edited by Rob-
ert L. Perkins, Macon, GA: Mercer University Press 1987, p. 32.
85 SUD, 72 / SKS 11, 186.
86 SUD, 67 / SKS 11, 181.
87 JC, 168 / Pap. IV B 1, p.145.
88 SUD, 49 / SKS 11, 164.
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the extent that selfhood is, this implies that eternality is a function of self-
consciousness, not a pre-existing condition of human beings. Once again,
this works against a Substantialist reading of Anti-Climacus: the “eter-
nal” in the self is no sort of immaterial soul that persists throughout
human life. But if we posit a moment in human life where the eternal “be-
gins” (without seriously suggesting consciousness arises in a single, dis-
criminable moment)89 we can have at best only a concept of the eternal
as infinitely extended duration rather than atemporality – otherwise,
how could the eternal have a beginning? Again, the idea seems to be
that when self-consciousness begins, the self relates to something radically
different from the temporality in which it has its (merely) human exis-
tence.
What the self comes into contact with in its engagement with the eter-
nal is the possibility of eschatological judgment, which collects the totality
of a life into a single object of assessment:
And when the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of temporality, when the
noise of secular life has grown silent and its restless or ineffectual activism
has come to an end, when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity,
then…eternity asks you and every individual in these millions and millions
about only one thing: whether you have lived in despair or not.90
In the face of this eschatological scenario, one is either in despair or one
has repented of despair and been saved. In the former case, “eternity does
not acknowledge you, it never knew you – or, still more terrible, it knows
you as you are known and it binds you to yourself in despair”;91 in the lat-
ter case, one is judged as not being in despair, whatever has gone before.
Hence the soteriological status of the totality depends entirely upon the
present moment s mode of self-relation; and it is for this reason that we
can speak of despair making it apparent we have always been in despair,
or of being saved from despair as removing the very possibility of despair.
Across the course of a human life it is entirely possible to slip back into
despair or lose acquired selfhood; but the viewpoint of spirit is entirely
present tense because entirely oriented towards how the totality to
which I relate myself will be judged in eternity. There is no question of
whether I have been in despair or how many times I have achieved self-
89 See my “ Interest in Kierkegaard s Structure of Consciousness” in International
Philosophical Quarterly 48:4, 192, December 2008, p. 439.
90 SUD, 27 / SKS 11, 143.
91 SUD, 28 / SKS 11, 144.
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hood; from the viewpoint of spirit, concerned for its salvation, there is
only the present-tense question of whether I am in despair.
None of this is to suggest that the non-despairing self somehow lives
“outside time.” Rather, the non-despairing self lives in a present moment
that is transfigured by contact with the eternal. It simultaneously relates
itself to what is temporal – the diachronically extended or “narrative” self
and its environment – and the eternal. To employ the language of Vigilius
Haufniensis, the pseudonym with whom Anti-Climacus is most closely
aligned, the non-despairing self lives in the Moment (Øieblikket), the
point where time and eternity intersect: “The moment is that ambiguity
in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept
of temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity
and eternity constantly pervades time.”92 It is through this contact with
the eternal, as Haufnienis puts it, that the division of time into past, pres-
ent and future “acquires its significance,”93 by relating temporally sche-
matised events to an eternal, transcendent goal. As Taylor notes, Anti-
Climacan selves are “tensed”: “The past is the self s actuality, the future
is its possibility, and the present is the moment in which freedom can be
exercised by actualizing possibilities.”94 Yet only in relation to the eternal,
with its possibility of final judgment, does the past appear as the actuality
for which I am responsible, the future as the stage for possibilities which I
am to actualise, and the present at the place where I relate this totality,
from birth to death, to the eternal beyond.
V.
What these admittedly incomplete observations on The Sickness Unto
Death give us is a picture of Anti-Climacan selfhood that is at once close-
ly aligned with and profoundly different to the contemporary neo-Lock-
ean picture of selfhood. The alignment is reasonably clear: insofar as he
takes self-consciousness to confer selfhood, Anti-Climacus belongs in the
“psychological theory” camp in the debate over personal identity. To the
extent that he, and Kierkegaard generally, provides lucid and compelling
phenomenologies of what it is to experience co-identity with one s re-
membered past and anticipated future – and what it is like not to do so
92 CA, 89 / SKS 4, 392.
93 CA, 89 / SKS 4, 392.
94 Taylor Kierkegaard s Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 7.
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– Kierkegaard stands, I believe, as a valuable source of insight and obser-
vation for theorists working in that tradition. Kierkegaard is a rich seam
that philosophers of personal identity and moral psychologists have bare-
ly begun to mine.
Yet it is important to keep clear that Anti-Climacus is trying to an-
swer a fundamentally different question to contemporary personal iden-
tity theorists, and this makes his picture of selfhood crucially different
too. To reiterate, “orthodox” neo-Lockeans ask a question about the cri-
teria for re-identifying selves at different points in time (other types of
neo-Lockeans, such as narrative theorists, arguably ask a question
about “characterization” instead).95 They seek to answer a purely meta-
physical question, albeit one that has crucial ethical and eschatological
implications to do with responsibility, self-interested concern and survival
(indeed, the metaphysical question is standardly motivated by the ethical
questions, and Locke himself seeks an account of identity that will hold
everything the self will be judged for on “the great Day, wherein the
Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open”).96 Yet ultimately the moral
facts are taken to supervene upon the metaphysical ones, which in them-
selves are morally neutral.
Anti-Climacus, too, starts from a moral-religious question about self-
hood, but develops his account of self-consciousness as self-constituting
from an internal perspective that is essentiallymorally normative. Despite
the somewhat professorial character of his writing, he does not step back
to impersonally consider the identity and persistence conditions of selves
as such. Rather, he remains on the level at which the question is asked in
the first place: the question of my selfhood, where this is a question of
what Johannes Climacus earlier called my infinite, passionate interest
in my eternal happiness. And as Anti-Climacus shows, this question can
only be asked from the inside; unlike the traditional question about iden-
tity, it cannot be asked tenselessly or impersonally, but only here, now and
for me. Hence I cannot ask “is A at t1 the same self as B at t2,” at least not
if we are asking about selves in the Anti-Climacan sense; the only ques-
tion I can ask – and given the moral and eschatological basis for the con-
cern for selfhood that Anti-Climacus is starting from, the only question I
should rightly be concerned about – is “is the self I remember being one
that I am to take responsibility for?” And given that there will only rarely
95 Schechtman The Constitution of Selves, pp. 73–92.
96 Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 294.
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be occasion to ask such a question, this really comes down to the question
“have I taken responsibility for my past and future?”
This may seem unsatisfying for personal identity theorists, but it does
have the (perhaps philosophically dubious) merit of excusing Anti-Clima-
cus from having to answer the difficult questions that have plagued that
debate since its inception. If the question of the selfhood created by
self-consciousness can only be asked from the here-and-now, then ques-
tions about the persistence of selves, and accordingly questions about un-
consciousness, amnesia, fission, fusion, etc. all dissolve into questions
about the persistence conditions of human beings – an interesting meta-
physical problem, certainly, but quite irrelevant to the question of the
self in Anti-Climacus terms. And in an important sense, it s also finally
irrelevant to the concerns for responsibility, self-interested concern and
survival that motivate us to ask questions about personal identity in the
first place. These concerns all imply a self that I cannot stop asking
about or caring about even after being shown that my human persistence
conditions won t furnish any non-trivial “deep further fact” about identi-
ty. It s this self, the incorrigible locus of self-concern, that is at the heart of
Anti-Climacus account, and which has its being in the moment in which
it appropriates its life in its entirety as all that it is answerable for. How
long such moments of self-conscious self-appropriation happen to last, a
question about psychological continuity which a neo-Lockean would nat-
urally ask, actually has no bearing upon the question of selfhood as Anti-
Climacus sees it. As a psychological state, self-constituting self-relation
may persist for just an instant or an entire lifetime, but in the fundamental
sense, selves only exist in one moment: the Moment. Right now.
This is a difficult thought, and I am not sure I have explained it as
clearly as I could have. Much remains to be worked out. Nonetheless,
Anti-Climacus, and Kierkegaard generally, stands as someone with im-
portant and challenging things to say to contemporary analytic philoso-
phers of personal identity – both about the phenomenology of personal
identity and the nature of the questions that should motivate any such in-
quiry.97
97 This paper has been made possible by a postdoctoral fellowship grant from the
Danish Research Council for the Humanities. I am also grateful to Alastair Han-
nay for helpful comments and suggestions.
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